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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(f) U.C.A. in that it is an appeal from a 
final judgment and conviction from the District Court in a 
criminal case. The proceeding below arose out of three separate 
criminal cases with nearly identical factual backgrounds which 
were consolidated at the Trial Court level, wherein each of the 
individual Defendants was charged by amended information filed 
May 22, 1989, with Unlawful Possession of Controlled Substances, 
on or about November 4, 1988, in violation of §58-37-8 U.C.A. 
(Elkins, R. 24, 25; Brown R. 118, 119), and related third degree 
felony offenses. Defendants1 Motion To Suppress was denied by 
the Trial Court June 1, 1989 (Elkins, R. 36-39). Defendants 
entered pleas of guilty, each to one count of possession of a 
controlled substance, a third degree felony, July 28, 1989, 
(Elkins, R. 42,, 57; Brown, R. 128) subject to a reservation of 
right to appeal from the Order Denying Defendantsf Motion To 
Suppress (Transcript of Change of Plea). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
The May 15, 1989, FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
ORDER, denying Appellants1 Motion to Suppress, entered June 1, 
1989, (Elkins R. 36-39) raises the following issues: 
1. The Search Warrant Affidavit failed to establish 
probable cause to support the Search Warrant. 
2. The "Good Faith" exception of United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897 (1984) cannot save a Search Warrant based upon an 
3 
Affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render 
official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable. 
3. The Trial Court erred in failing to find that the Search 
Warrant Affidavit contains false and misleading information. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Interpretation of the following constitutional provisions is 
determinative of the issues presented. The Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, and its identical counterpart, 
Article I, Section 14 of The Utah State Constitution, provide as 
follows: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no warrants shall issue*, but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath and 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The cases against the three individual Defendants/Appellants 
were filed separately and subsequently consolidated into two 
separate files, one for the Elkins Appellants, Appellate No. 
890555-CA and 890556, the other for Appellant Robert Brown, 
Appellate No. 890554-CA. It is a matter of minor confusion 
worthy of mention that the various filings were apparently done 
by the clerks without a great deal of thought. As a consequence 
Elkins pleadings found their way into Brown's file and vice-
versa. All references to the record hereinafter will be "Brown, 
R. " or "Elkins, R. " as appropriate. The reversed filing is 
merely noted to obviate any initial confusion as to why citations 
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to the record may appear to be inapposite. Suffice it to say the 
confusion is minimal, if inconvenient, and all pleadings 
applicable to the individual Appellants found their way into one 
file or the other. 
Appellant Robert Brown was initially charged in Third 
Circuit Court by Information November 18, 1988, alleging one 
count of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance With 
Intent to Distribute a Controlled Substance, Marijuana, 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) U.C.A., on or about November 4, 1988, a third degree 
felony (Brown, R. 20, 21). Defendants David Elkins and Susan 
Elkins were initially charged in Third Circuit Court by 
Information alleging two counts, Count I, Production of a 
Controlled Substance, Marijuana, 58-37-8(1)(a)(i), U.C.A., and 
Count II, Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i), U.C.A., Psilocin Mushrooms, third degree felonies, on 
or about November 4, 1988 (Brown, R, 15 and 16). 
From combined proceedings, preliminary hearings held before 
Honorable Paul Grant, Third Circuit Court, on January 3, 1989, 
Defendant/Appellants were bound over to stand trial in the Third 
District Court as charged (Elkins, R. 13, 14; Brown, R. 24, 25). 
On March 3, 1989, Appellants Moved in the District Court to 
suppress all evidence resulting from the execution of a Search 
Warrant and resulting seizure of items from their respective 
residences (Brown, R. 55,56). 
A hearing of the evidentiary issues raised in Appellants' 
Motion To Suppress was granted and had before the Honorable Frank 
G. Noel, March 8, 1989 (Elkins, R. 78, Transcript of 
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Proceedings). Appellants' Motion was denied by the Trial Court 
by its Minute Entry of April 5, 1989 (Elkins, R. 36, 39), entered 
June 1, 1989. 
The State moved to Amend the Information as to each 
Appellant January 6, 1989 (Brown, R. 48 49), which motion was 
granted, subject to the Trial Court's further Order remanding the 
added or alternative charges to Circuit Court for further 
preliminary hearing, which Order was entered June 1, 1989 (Brown, 
R. 120, 121; Elkins, R. 40, 41). The Amended Informations were 
filed May 22, 1989 (Elkins, R. 24, 25; Brown, R. 118, 119). 
On July 18, 1989, each of the Appellants waived their right 
to further preliminary hearing on the Amended Information (Brown, 
R. 125, Docketing Statement; Elkins, R.9, Docketing Statement). 
To Count II of the Amended Information Appellants Susan 
Elkins and David Elkins entered their pleas of guilty to the 
charge of Possession of a Controlled Substance, Marijuana, With 
Intent to Distribute, 58-37-8(1)(a) (i) U.C.A., a third degree 
felony. Count I (possession of mushrooms) was dismissed on 
Motion of the State (Elkins, R. 42, 57). On the same date 
Appellant Robert Brown entered a plea of guilty to the first 
alternative of Count I of the Amended Information, Possession of 
a Controlled Substance, Marijuana, With Intent to Distribute, 58-
37-8(l)(a)(i), U.C.A., a third degree felony (Brown, R. 128). 
The transcript of proceedings July 28, 1989, of the guilty 
pleas of each of the Appellants reflects that the guilty pleas 
were entered conditionally and subject to Appellants' right to 
appeal the denial of their Motion To Suppress pursuant to State 
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v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 87 Utah Adv. Rep. 32, (1988) (R. 78, 
Transcript of Change of Plea Proceedings, pp 1,2). 
Each of the Appellants was sentenced Honorable Frank G. 
Noel, Judge Presiding, September 1, 1989, to the indeterminate 
term not to exceed five years, stayed upon condition of two years 
probation (Brown, R. 165, 164; Elkins, R. 58, 61). 
From the Judgment and Sentence of the Court entered 
September 5, 1989, and the "Order Denying Defendants' Motion For 
Reconsideration" of Appellatefs Motion To Suppress filed July 28, 
1989 (Brown, R. 136-151), Appellants bring this appeal. 
Notice of Appeal was filed and entered September 6, 1989 
(Brown, R. 155; Elkins, R. 64, 69). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Appellants argue that the Search Warrant which was 
executed on their homes was not supported by a Search Warrant 
Affidavit which, given the totality of circumstances, was not 
grounded in sufficient articulable particularized facts to 
establish probable cause. 
2. Appellants argue further that the Search Warrant was so 
clearly lacking in probable cause, that the Warrant consisted in 
the mere ratification of the bare unfounded conclusions of 
others, and that the Magistrate's determination reflected an 
improper analysis of the totality of the circumstances presented 
by the Affidavit, to such an extent as to be incapable of 
providing valid authorization for the search of their homes. 
3. Appellants argue that certain statements in the 
Affidavit, particularly with respect to observance of the 
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silhouette of a Marijuana Leaf, was false, recklessly make, and 
that the Trial Court erred in not suppressing evidence produced 
as a result of a search based upon such misleading statements in 
the Affidavit. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about November 4, 1988, The Honorable Dennis Fuchs, 
Judge of the Third (then Fifth) Circuit Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, Utah, issued a Search Warrant for premises at 1268 
Montgomery Street and 1276 Montgomery Street in Salt Lake City, 
Utah. The Search Warrant and the Affidavit for Search Warrant 
were introduced into evidence at the hearing on the Motion To 
Suppress, as Exhibit "1" and "2", respectively, and are 
reproduced in the addendum. (Transcript of Motion To Suppress, 
p. 59). 
On November 4, 1988, police officers from the Metro-
Narcotics Strike Force executed the Search Warrant on the 
residence and attached structures, of Robert Brown, at 1276 
Montgomery, and David and Susan Elkins at 1268 Montgomery, in 
Salt Lake City, Utah. The evidence, specifically quantities of 
Marijuana taken from each of the houses, provided the basis of 
the charges before the Trial Court (Brown, R. 119; Elkins, R. 
25). 
This appeal stems from the Trial Court's denial of 
Appellants' efforts to cause the evidence seized pursuant to this 
Search Warrant to be suppressed. 
8 
POINT I 
THE SEARCH
 W A R R A N T A F F I D A V I T FAILED TO ESTABLISH 
PROBABLE CAUSE TO SUPPORT THE SEARCH WARRANT 
: r»- l o u ; .. Amendment < ...-. M- ^ . - I U 
A r t i c l e * 1 S e r t i o i . 14 : t h e \'r r* S t a t e C o n s t ! t u t ior. r e q u i r e 
rt
~ I y iJ|" I '• -~r ^% * rv: • ' p r o h a b . e 
c a u s e s u p p o r t e d ai. ; , : t i r m a t i o n . ^ 
:e r ;e r m i n a t i ~-> i • " >^:% ** ~i *. s: *: d e t a c h e d 
' •"! y - * ' - t - U. v ^c l . u * v . , „ ij> . Z U 4 , Z, J. Z, , J - W J . L> . v- L . 
1 6 4 2 , 68 L . E d . 2 d *« 1 : . 
The f,in',4",ri» '*• * *i •* : i .".^urt, as the reviewing Court, is 
n o t t n • j:: n 11: p o s e o f :i e t e i m :ii n :i n g w h e t h e r 
probable cause existed. The Trial Coin tf s primary duty is to 
foci is on the Affidavi t and Warrant and to review the conclusi on 
Magisti a >„ 
•:'. f.f icient fact- M o> %* -- :: " i1 "».. • • t- i. reienue.^ i : .; . a 
• ions n e c e s s a r * tot-pmr '.it: or *~ r- -hahle c a u ^ e . 
Giordenello v. >- - - : ; ' 
L.Ed.2d 1503(1958). - Search Wari.i .1 Mti.iaw - ^  -. -• . . 
* o n t a i n e d w : «-v - -* * * - * j "^ n v - r s 
: ie document , . - , ./arrant 
utriiF information otherwise rehabilitated. U.S. v. Martinez, 
"
 u
°
 r
' ' Axle. . . Holbrook, 
135 P. 2d z.4, t..-.; . .. Allen v. Lindbeck, 93 P. 2d 920, 97 I IT. 
471 M 9 4 3 ) Thp» role of the reviewing Court is to deternii ne 
••.lint Iaii ' I . ' I I . ,! r" I pr . ' basis" * : Lhe 
Magistrate to conclude tha t: probable cause existed, See Illinois 
v Gates, 462 U.S. 213 at 238(1983). 
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Illinois v. Gates,, id, changed the course, to some extent, 
of existing law. The decision in Gates overruled what was 
characterized as "mechanistic application" of the so called "two 
pronged test" established by Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108(1964) 
and Spinelli v. U.S., 393 U.S. 410(1969). Prior to Gates the 
"two pronged test" was utilized when, as in the Affidavit before 
the Court in this case, information from an unidentified or 
otherwise unknown informant was the basis of the information 
contained in the Affidavit which formed the predicate for the 
Warrant. 
The Aguilar - Spinelli "two pronged test" worked in the 
following fashion. Under the first, the "basis of knowledge" 
prong, facts must be revealed which would permit the judicial 
officer to conclude that the informant had a basis for his 
allegations, i.e., "articulable facts" as opposed to mere 
conclusions. The second, "veracity", prong, requires that 
sufficient information be supplied to establish either the 
inherent "credibility" of the informant or the "reliability" of 
his information on this particular occasion. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure, 2d Ed., Chapter 3, p. 613; Aguilar v. Texas, supra; 
Spinelli v. U.S., supra. 
These factors (the two prongs) still retain considerable 
significance under Gates in the sense that they merit careful 
consideration. For this reason the basic rationale of Aguilar and 
Spinelli is still a viable and practical tool for analysis, if 
not as an exclusive determinative formula. What the Gates Court 
says is required is a view by the reviewing Court of the 
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" to ta I i ty of • l h I r «ri T rniiistances" p r e sen t ed uy une At" f idavi t , a 
t a s k , s a i d t h e Court ' , no t s u s c e p t i b l e ^ e x p o s i t i o n « 
" p r e s c r i b e d s e t of r u l e s , " I l l i n o i s v . Gates , -Ini: J S 
T i l l * f ' M U r t " i l l J Mi-11 S . i" r ; d t B b • ' . . ' ' , i\thll\ *. -T • *-- w-; 
that probable cause was any less important ^imp±y prescnu-a 
a more global approach: 
• . • an informants "veracity," "reliability", ai id 
"basis of knowledge" are all highly relevant in 
determining the value of his report.... (These 
elements) should be understood simply as closely 
intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate 
the common sense, practical question whether there 
is "probable cause" to believe that contraband or 
evidence is located in a particular place. 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 230. 
...(these elements) are Detter understood as 
relevant considerations i .u the totality-of-the-
circumstances analysis that traditionally has 
guided probable cause determinations: a deficiency 
in one may be compensated for, in determining the 
over all reliability of a tip, by a strong showing 
as to the other, or by some other indicia of 
reliability, (citations omitted) Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 IJ S. at 233. 
\ number of U tal I decisions have f ol] owed ii I fii le ; /ake of 
Gate^ 
Utah -^e e a. S t a t e v . Ba i l ey , , i , , L . *.«, ; S t a t e 
. .- r'.±-i^ -_u - ' v ' '"• S t a t e v. JBabbeJLl, rm l .:a 
Gates t o t h e f a c t s and circuiiistcinces p r e sen t ed by tht: Af f i d av i t 
for Search Warrant -<*- • a n a l y z e T +-N-> . ?. .• -r* . ^y.- idprations 
t h e case . 
The Af f i r i av : o c i t e - . I t^ -r;? ; : : e-i . i nknown 
informants execute-1 * unknow -^ fnn 4 - - A^^'~ Crime 
So lve r s an* Robert ^, . i : : ie>, l u o p e t i i A - . , 
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unknowns' "basis of knowledge", "veracity", or "reliability" is 
factually substantiated with any particulars whatsoever. 
Tests for evaluating informant information have 
traditionally been based upon factors such as past performance of 
the informant, admissions against the informant's interest, self-
verifying detail, disclosure of basis of knowledge, sufficiency 
of information, et cetera. Nothing in Gates can be construed as 
vitiating or diminishing the relevance or importance of these 
tests. They are explicitly deemed relevant. 
As to the "basis of knowledge" question, there is absolutely 
no way of knowing what, if any, "articulable facts" formed the 
basis of 6637's conclusions, because they are not set forth in 
the Affidavit. There is no answer to the query, how did 6637 
come to the conclusion's he drew(?) What did he see and when did 
he see it? The primary (6637) informant's statements, whenever 
they were made, do not disclose how he concluded that Marijuana 
was grown at either house. What training or experience did he 
possess? What did he see and when? The specificity for the 
first informant's conclusions is absent. 
The curious statement that "6637 stated that he has 
confronted children who have possessed baggies of Marijuana 
brought from these buildings," is emotion-laden and attention 
getting. It is however an incredible assertion, even if he had 
"...a particularized interest in the welfare of one of the 
children," whatever that is supposed to mean and remains devoid 
of factual foundation. How did 6637 know the "children" 
"obtained" Marijuana "from these buildings"? How did he know it 
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was Marijuana? • ? is/her "particularized interest" and 
what probative . -. -u ~ .*• •. n ' U I P S ^ q^a4-^""" " ^ 
have a foundation in any reasonable factual specificity, 
cur ions s f a hproert 1 •, i t»M|arci ijicj "children." and a "particular i ?^d 
i inter est" are characteristic of the o 1:1 lei statemei 1 t 
Affidavit in thai* they seem more calculated more to produce heat 
i '" n f 1 11 I < • 11 i I L e m o t i o n a I c o n t e n t y e t 
/Miecessarij y - \ .
 ti^ , .th facts, i .e. justifiably cogi l i z a b l e 
- ^r + ^ , r t v \ i i i , •:-_ c o n c l u s i o n s o £ t e n h a v e 1 i 1 1 1 e o r no 
• • io-3u^ -f H r p l i i M ] i i - N — " - r e d i r i : : r 'he 
Affida\ * simply says that informant: - iir.ber i ; ?rime Solve: sM 
num;.*, una 
"Crime Solvers" i*- .* - *: * *: .M . i .;.-i-.* . r.ior,.:ati on 
was related lether •** f irmat ion .^i ••-• en 
related direct,
 ; . . „ : . . > . i 
i'ir inferable. It is : mpossit ; -.- > j*.iUjh • - - , * i:./ Lev-?: : 
..moentif ie , .ji,^  undifferentiated statement -.-
informant, •-* atements subsequently attributed * Crime Solver's" 
I iy t lie A f f 
addition ^^ f K e fact that the **: . : . - - - ^e 
the basis ol primary informant's knowledge or why it should 
i,; : ~ In state why "Crime Solvers" 
should be accorded such deference in its ability DO gather .jnd 
relate sensit:^^ infonnat 1 r>* e Affiant simply states that: he 
consid'-: - - a I: toe HI .is*1 he- i" i in fi vniianf "i fully 
identified himself to Crime Solvers." So what? This statement, 
apart from providing no information, begs the question: Who is 
the informant and what is "Crime Solvers"? Why should the 
Magistrate trust either the informant, or "Crime Solvers"? 
"Crime Solvers" is not an arm of the Salt Lake County Attorney's 
office, or some other Governmental Agency to which this Court 
should give deference? It isn't entitled to judicial notice. 
Whatever talismanic qualities "Crime Solvers" may have, they 
do not ascend to the level of establishing, ipso facto, the 
"reliability" and "veracity" of every crackpot who calls in, 
identifies himself, and says he "confronted children" flaunting 
little baggies of Marijuana. 
Even the reliability and veracity of whatever person(s) were 
involved at "Crime Solvers" remains a mystery. Certainly the 
actual person(s) at "Crime Solvers" ought at least to be 
identified, or alternatively his/her and its reliability in some 
way established. "Crime Solvers" is merely a second in a chain 
of unidentified informants whose "basis of knowledge", 
"reliability" and "veracity" must be improperly assumed as 
established to sustain this Search Warrant. 
The Affidavit treats all these matters as given. But "basis 
of knowledge", "reliability", and "veracity," are not such 
clearly indisputable matters that they might simply be judicially 
noticed under Rule 201, U.R.E. Evidentiary facts are required. 
Note the language of the Utah Supreme Court as long ago as 1943: 
...the affidavit must set forth facts 
sufficient to cause a discreet and prudent 
man to believe that the accused had the 
property sought to be seized. The fact that 
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the affiant says he has that belief, in and 
of itself, is not sufficient to make 'probable 
cause. Furthermore, the allegation in the 
affidavit that said defendant has twice 
during the past three months been arrested 
and convicted for the illegal use of said 
bottles, and that he refused to refrain from 
using them is not sufficient to make probable 
cause as contemplated by the general statute 
or the Constitution. The affidavit in this 
case further sets forth that defendant now 
freely admits that he is continuing the use 
thereof. This is a mere conclusion of the 
affiant; no facts being set forth upon which 
a complaint for perjury could be predicated 
if falsely given. The substance of the 
admission is not given nor is the person 
named to whom the purported admission was 
made. The affidavit does not show probable 
cause to exist for the issuance of a search 
and seizure warrant under the general laws 
and the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
Allen v. Holbrook, 135 P.2d at 247. (Emphasis 
added) 
13 i ons supp 1 1 ed independen11y 
from * - ' i f o r m a n * ; t;t j ai id "Cr ioie S o l v e r s t 
A f f i a n t m a k e s o t h e r a s s e r t i o n . - - a b s e n t f o u n d a t i o n a l f a c t s . 
* ^ ir .- *. ' i t t h e W a r r a n t 
a s i d e f r o m ^ nem-- : pl.i<,<;t. . »o a-, a s c e r t a i n - t s 
" s t a l e n e s s " , c o n s i s t s o f pi l r p o r t e d o b s e r v a t i o n s f ron l i o m ; a 
c a n a I . I"»cf \ i r I I 111 • I;>at;ky<i r <J •» i 11 I II11 • I 111 111 11 • I I i t • • t • • *•••'•. - --. 
have no o b j ec t i v e ev iden t i a ry j u s t i f i c a t i o n e i the r 'owever, 
because the Affiant se t s forth no basis for his conclusion, e, 11. , 
that: " 1:1 le t t ; c , :: -: en ou* n i 1 i i | losses!:', in tin y -HIM l l dp t .1 i I fih 17 
described " •: a i l s? Described to wiiom," iiiiin M is 
unl ikely such '"small lotai Is" were anythinq other than the color 
of nain+' idea t ion oi WLIIUOWS <inu uiiifi uc n immdiint > 1 w i '•; 
available * anv passerby and having nothing to do with criminal 
a si in f« the " d e t a i l s " are undisc losed, i t i s 
impossible to check what they were and independently determine 
whether or not they were of any probative value whatsoever. Did 
they merely verify that two brick houses stood side by side, or 
were there more sinister details? It is not possible to check 
the accuracy of the Affiant's conclusion from this Affidavit 
because there are no facts recited which would facilitate such an 
analysis. Certainly no prosecution for perjury could be mounted, 
which has been used as a test of sufficient particulars, because 
the conclusions are too diffuse and conclusionary. Allen v. 
Holbrook, supra. 
The Affiant further fails to provide any basis for his own 
naked conclusion that he smelled growing Marijuana or saw the 
silhouette of a Marijuana Leaf through a "translucent" panel. 
These are simply more foundationless, barren legal and factual 
conclusions. Which house was the Affiant even talking about and 
at what point in time? From which if either house did the smell 
emanate? If the pre-view of the residences took place in summer 
or fall there would presumably be an abundance of vegetation 
around the canal. How did the Affiant distinguish Marijuana from 
the ambient smell from the water and weeds? Or was it winter? 
Where was the leaf silhouette? What did the leaf silhouette look 
like? Was it similar to what the Affiant had been trained to 
observe? What training does this Affiant have, if any, to 
recognize either sight or smell of growing Marijuana as opposed 
to various other plants, waterborne vegetation, and growing 
things? How opaque was the "translucent" material? Who is the 
Affiant? Who is Robert Caffrey, if not the Affiant (reference is 
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made to an Affiant ot^e i-i-.rjo Caffrey although Robert Caffrey is 
the apparent signax ; . ; • • : u s I.J t ' <»r •M ,ot" + " •,n 
leads to the further problem that information attribute; 
"Affiant" In the Affidavit may be Prr^r another source entirely, 
which information may never have beer- ? *-/1 a 1 • n U I H .,><•. . , 
Robert Caffrey, whoever he may be. 
7 u e s t i C : ; s • diib w e i . /r.i :<" " ^ 
hyper-technics, c-. .. L i.tormation was legitim, ' 
facts could hdve easi ; - bee;i supplied, 
-quadron ?f 
^clif>- search . ? , , ^i,:, :.L,/„I:S : : n -. ,*t:;J<r/-.' relates v<: ai 
ir f I'-n-.^ T k - M*I ; .',* ^ irPi ' is i nv ."' ! > * * :> Panqui* ::r 
wnai 
./arti'-uiar -governmental eni.n, , wit: :. . years experience 
and/or wha+~ training, :f . "*-*• \ffidav:* *a i tcks these 
even t h e s e p r i m i t i v e r e q i 11 s i t e s , T" 1 i e C o i i r t i s J e £ t w i 11 I o i i t a 
c l u e a s t o any of t:l IE "relevant considerations" , the basis of 
knowledge (experience or training), r el I abil i ty and credibility 
( at least proper idei i ti f ica ti oi I) o f tl ,„ =s: A f fi ai: i t 1 :i I n tsei f I I : > I: 
o n l y a r e t h e r e n o s u b s t a n t i a t i n g f a c t s , t h e r e a r e i I '" t e v e n 
r e l i a b l e c o n c l u s i o n s . i t c a n ' t e v e n be d e t e r m i n e d who t h e 
A f f i a n t i s . 
The obvious inadequacies of rhi : A-arrant are manifest when 
viewf-M) I r i mi llu'1 perspe • ^ ve oi il.iin^;s . Gate s , supra, and fts 
progeny. G ates <J I U mi brogate all . ^q.. i rements substu: :. - , o 
c o n c l u s i o n s or sup p o r t trie reliabi ', i ; .u. • ; .credibility of 
i i I f o r in a i I t s a i I d A f • *.: i e c e -; i:r 1 *"' o f 
setting forth articulable facts rather than naked assertions of 
conclusions. Gates did not set the stage for the mere "rubber 
stamp" approval by the Magistrate of the "bare conclusions of 
others." 
Our earlier cases illustrate the limits 
beyond which a magistrate may not venture in 
issuing a warrant. A sworn statement of an 
affiant that "he has cause to suspect and 
does believe" that liquor illegally brought 
into the United States is located on certain 
premises will not do. Nathanson v. United 
States, 290 U.S. 41(1933). An affidavit must 
provide the magistrate with a substantial 
basis for determining the existence of 
probable cause, and the wholly conclusory 
statement at issue in Nathanson failed to 
meet this requirement. An officer T s 
statement that "[a]ffiants have received 
reliable information from a credible person 
and do believe" that heroin is stored in a 
home, is likewise inadequate. Aguilar v. 
Texas, 378 U.S. 108(1964). As in Nathanson, 
this is a mere conclusory statement that 
gives the magistrate virtually no basis at 
all for making a judgement regarding probable 
cause. Sufficient information must be 
presented to the magistrate to allow that 
official to determine probable cause; his 
action cannot be a mere ratification of the 
bare conclusions of others. In order to 
ensure that such an abdication of the 
magistrate's duty does not occur, courts must 
continue to conscientiously review the 
sufficiency of affidavits on which warrants 
are issued. Illinois v. Gates 462 U.S. at 
239. (Emphasis added) 
The information attributed to the informant via "Crime 
Solvers" is so conclusory, unsubstantiated and without inferable 
credibility or reliability, and the "verifying" information is 
nothing more than the naked conclusions of an Affiant no better 
known than 6637, that it could not provide a basis for 
establishing probable cause. 
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How ! . trie Magistrate know any .L these people or their 
conclusions ure trustworthy? Probable Cause must be grounde<i in 
more thar. suppositioi Before authorizing the search ol a 
citizens' • > -• that J I is not 
done on assumption. justifying uticu-ar intrusion the 
Affidavit must point to specific and "articulable facts" which, 
together wi th the LdLioiidi mieiences L rom those fact s, 
reasonably warrant that intrusion. Terry v. Ohio, 392 ' c ' , 
88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880(1968).' 
1
 The Supreme Court of The United States made the following 
statement in specific reference to the requirement of 
"articulable facts" in the landmark decision of Terry v. Oho, 88 
S.Ct. 1868, at 1880 in footnote 18: 
This demand for specificity in the information upon 
which police action is predicated is the central 
teaching of this Court's Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. See Beck v. State of Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 
96-97, 85 S.Ct. 223, 229, 13 L.Ed. 2d 142 (1964); Kerr 
v. State of California, 374 U.S. 23, 34-37, 83 S.Ct. 
1623, 1632, 10 L.Ed.2d 726(1963); Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-484, 83 S.Ct. 407, 416, 9 
L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 
253, 261-262, 80 S.Ct. 1431, 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1688 
(1960); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100-102, 
80 S.Ct. 168, 171, L.Ed.2d 134 (1959); Draper v. United 
States, 358 U.S. 307, 312-314, 79 S.Ct. 329, 333, 3 
L.Ed.2d 327 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 
160, 175-178, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1312, 93 L.Ed. 1879 
(1949); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15017, 
68 S.Ct. 367, 371, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948); United States 
v. Pi Re, 332 U.S. 581, 593-595, 68 S.Ct. 222, 229, 92 
L.Ed. 210 (1948); Husty V. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 
700-701, 51 S.Ct. 240, 242, 75 L.Ed. 629 (1931); Dunbra 
v. United States, 268 U.S. 435, 551, 45 S.Ct. 546, 549, 
69 L.Ed. 1032 (1925); Carroll v. United States, 267 
U.S. 132, 159-162, 45 S.Ct. 280, 288, 69 L.Ed. 543 
(1925); Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645, 24 L.Ed. 
1035 (1878). 
This statement of the law has obviously wi 
. ,f time and is appropriate and applicable today. 
i 
The Affidavit before this Court leaves unanswered virtually 
all of the important factual questions, which must be inferred, 
assumed or divined. Issuance of a Search Warrant on such a state 
of facts is an affront to both sovereigns1 Constitutions. 
Another grave deficiency in the Affidavit is its complete 
failure to set forth any time frame for the informant's 
information, receipt of the information by "Crime Solvers", 
Affiant's receipt of the information from Crime Solvers, and when 
the Affiant came into possession of any of the recited 
information. 
A Search Warrant Affidavit unlike an Arrest Warrant 
Affidavit must set forth some information in order to place the 
events recited in time. The following discussion elucidates the 
reasons why this is so: 
The most obvious difference between probable 
cause to arrest and probable cause to search 
is that the former is concerned with 
historical facts while the latter is 
concerned with facts relating to a presently 
existing condition. If a police officer is 
summoned to a crime scene and is told by the 
victim and several witnesses that an armed 
robbery has occurred and that a particular 
person known to them by name committed it, 
there then exists probable cause to arrest 
that person. Assuming no contrary facts 
later come to light this probable cause will 
continue to exist for an indefinite period. 
But this quite obviously is not so with 
respect to the probable cause that the robber 
has the fruits of the crime concealed in his 
residence. Though it may be permissible to 
assume without direct proof that the robber 
had taken the stolen goods to his residence, 
so that a warrant for that place could issue 
a day or so following the robbery, it cannot 
be likewise assumed that these goods will 
remain there indefinitely. If the search 
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warrant were sought weeks or months after the 
crime and without more current information 
tending to show that the stolen property was 
presently in that place, the judicial officer 
would be compelled to conclude that probable 
cause was lacking. Search cases, then, in 
contrast to arrest cases, present the unique 
problem of whether the information relied 
upon to establish probable cause has grown 
"stale." LaFave, Search and Seizure, 2d Ed., 
Chapter 3, p. 75-76. (Emphasis Added) 
One Court has recently refused to uphold a Search Warrant 
for this very reason on facts strikingly similar to the instant 
case: 
...we do not hold that the absence of a 
reference to time in an affidavit makes the 
subsequent warrant automatically defective. 
Rather, in such a situation, we look to the 
four corners of the affidavit to determine if 
we can establish with certainty the time 
during which the criminal activity was 
observed. If the time can be inferred in 
this manner, then the police officer's 
objective good faith reliance on the 
magistrate's assessment will cure the 
omission. 
Here, however, the omission of any reference 
to time is so complete that none can be 
inferred. The only statements that are in 
the present tense are those pre-printed on 
the form. The information supplied by the 
affiant is imprecise ("I have probable cause 
to believe that on or in" (emphasis added)) 
and is worded in the past tense. There are 
no terms such as "recently" or "now" and no 
reference to an urgent situation ...which 
would enable the court to ascertain the time 
factor. Accordingly the affidavit is 
defective and the warrant invalid. 
An affidavit such as this, with absolutely no 
reference to a time frame, does not provide 
sufficient information upon which a probable 
cause determination can be made. Herrington 
v. State, 697 S.W.2d 899, 900-901 (Ark. 
1985). 
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The Affidavit in the case at bar falls squarely within this 
holding. Appellants are aware of Utah authorities which would 
ignore this requirement, however, Appellants urge that under 
these circumstances such cases are not in point because the 
Affidavit is otherwise so sadly deficient. 
Considering all of the relevant factors this Affidavit fails 
to satisfy the most primitive notion of minimum standards and 
should be held to be insufficient to satisfy the "totality-of-the 
circumstances" test. 
POINT II 
THE "GOOD FAITH" EXCEPTION OF UNITED STATES V. LEON, 
468 U.S. 897 (1984) CANNOT SAVE A SEARCH WARRANT BASED 
UPON AN AFFIDAVIT SO LACKING IN INDICIA OF PROBABLE 
CAUSE AS TO RENDER OFFICIAL BELIEF IN ITS EXISTENCE 
ENTIRELY UNREASONABLE. 
In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the Supreme 
Court of the United States held that the exclusionary rule should 
not apply when the officer conducting the search acted in 
objectively reasonable reliance on a Warrant issued by a neutral 
and detached Magistrate that subsequently is determined to be 
invalid. 
The State will undoubtedly make a great point of urging the 
"good-faith" doctrine of United States vs. Leon, i.d., upon this 
Court and of impressing upon the Court the "great deference" to 
be paid a Magistrate's determination of probable cause. 
However, the Supreme Court also made very clear that Courts 
were not simply to unquestioningly accept every Search Warrant. 
The Supreme Court in Leon, i.d., set forth the following 
analysis: 
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"Deference to the magistrate, however, is not 
boundless. It is clear, first, that the 
deference accorded to a magistrate's finding 
of probable cause does not preclude inquiry 
into the knowing or reckless falsity of the 
affidavit on which that determination was 
based. Second, the courts must also insist 
that the magistrate purport to "perform his 
'neutral and detached' function and not serve 
merely as a rubber stamp for the police." A 
magistrate failing to "manifest that 
neutrality and detachment demanded of a 
judicial officer when presented with a 
warrant application" and who acts instead as 
"an adjunct law enforcement officer" cannot 
provide valid authorization for an otherwise 
unconstitutional search. 
Third, reviewing courts will not defer to a 
warrant based on an affidavit that does not 
"provide the magistrate with a substantial 
basis for determining the existence of 
probable cause". "Sufficient information 
must be presented to the magistrate to allow 
that official to determine probable cause; 
his action cannot be a mere ratification of 
the bare conclusions of others." Even if the 
warrant application was supported by more 
than a "bare bones" affidavit, a reviewing 
court may properly conclude that, 
notwithstanding the deference that 
magistrates deserve, the warrant was invalid 
because the magistrate's probable-cause 
determination reflected an improper analysis 
of the totality of the circumstances, or 
because the form of the warrant was improper 
in some respect. U.S. vs. Leon, 82 L.Ed. 2d 
at 693-694 (footnotes and citations omitted). 
The Supreme Court of Arkansas, in its discussion of the Leon 
exception and those factors causing it to find a Search Warrant 
be constitutionally unsupportable, reasoned as follows: 
"In Leon, the Supreme Court not only 
announced the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule, it also delineated four 
errors which an officer's objective good 
faith cannot cure. These occur (1) when the 
magistrate is misled by information the 
affiant knew was false; (2) if the magistrate 
wholly abandons his detached and neutral 
judicial role; (3) when the affidavit is "so 
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lacking in indicia of probable cause as to 
render official belief in its existence 
entirely unreasonable", quoting Brown vs. 
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11, 95 S.Ct. 
2254, 2265, 45 L.Ed. 2d 416 (1975); and (4) 
when a warrant is so facially deficient "that 
the executing officers cannot reasonably 
presume it to be valid", Leon, supra, 104 
S.Ct. at pp. 3421-22. In its discussion of 
the third exception, the Court explained, 
"sufficient information must be presented to 
the magistrate to allow that official to 
determine probable cause; his action cannot 
be a mere ratification of the bare 
conclusions of others," quoting Illinois vs. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 
L.Ed.2d 527 (1983 ) .Herrington vs. State, 
supra, 697 S.W.2d 899, 901 (Ark. 1985). 
Regardless of any other information or analysis which might 
apply to the Search Warrant taken as a whole, the Court must 
conclude that, by even the most flexible of standards, no 
probable cause was stated. The Affidavit is void of even a 
passing reference for example to any facts in support of a search 
of 1276 Montgomery, the Brown residence, and no evidence suggests 
that probable cause ever did exist with respect to it. Only 
slightly less suspect is 1268 Montgomery, the Elkins residence. 
There was no "substantial basis" for issuance of the Warrant for 
either home and it could not be deemed "objectively reasonable" 
to conclude that such probable cause did exist under Leon or 
otherwise. 
It is also submitted that certain facts simply must be set 
forth, e.g., who and what the Affiant is, when the information 
was gathered, and some basis for the conclusions drawn. There is 
not one scintilla of admissible evidence which would support a 
finding of probable cause. Even in administrative decisions 
there must be a "residuum" of competent legal evidence (more than 
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a scintilla) in order to escape reversal on appeal for being 
"arbitrary and capricious". See e.g., Kehl v. Schwendiman, 735 
P.2d 413 (Ct. App. 1987). The "residuum rule" is obviously not a 
standard for review here, however, Defendants do believe that at 
least a scintilla of legally competent evidence should attend the 
finding of probable cause in order to satisfy the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution. The Affidavit in the 
instant matter contains not a single scintilla of such evidence. 
Search Warrant Affidavits don't need to be hyper-technical. 
But they are not prepared by laymen. They are drafted by 
prosecuting attorneys for the most part, who are well versed in 
the elements which make evidence admissible and reliable and can 
readily be counted upon present the articulable particularized 
facts when called upon. 
The Search Warrant Affidavit in the case before this Court 
was so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to make official 
belief in its existence entirely unreasonable. It fails to meed 
minimum standards of providing a substantial basis grounded in 
specific facts. The Magistrate's action in issuing the Warrant 
constituted a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others 
and the Warrant was wholly invalid because the Magistrate's 
probable cause determination reflected an improper analysis of 
the totality of the circumstances. Such a Search Warrant cannot 
provide valid authorization even for an otherwise unlawful 
search. U.S. v. Leon, supra, 82 L.ed.2d at 693-694. 
These Appellants stand as surrogates for every man. Their 
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rights are the rights of us all. Our society is what it is 
because of these constitutional protections, not in spite of 
them. It is the measure of the evolvement of civilization in 
this State not how we treat our best citizens, but how we treat 
our worst. Consequently, a case such as this is of critical 
concern. If the message of this case is that the police in Utah 
may rely on the Magistrates and the Magistrates on the police, on 
whom may the citizens rely to protect their justifiable 
expectation of privacy under Article I, Section 14 and the Fourth 
Amendment? 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT 
THE SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT CONTAINS FALSE 
AND MISLEADING INFORMATION. 
The Affidavit states that the "silhouette of a Marijuana 
Leaf", and what appeared to be Marijuana Plants were seen by the 
Affiant, at 1268 Montgomery. 
As it turns out, a belatedly identified "Officer" Caffrey, 
in his later testimony, recanted and confessed that what he said 
he saw in the Affidavit he did not and could not have seen. Note 
the following colloquy between defense counsel and Mr. Caffrey: 
Q: let me interrupt you just a second. Your Affidavit 
indicates that you observed the silhouette of a 
Marijuana Leaf. Where was that leaf in relationship to 
the houses? 
A: That was on the inside pressed against this translucent 
panel of the greenhouse, attached to 1268 Montgomery 
Street. And it would be on the South wall of this 
greenhouse, near where it intersects with the West 
wall. 
Q: When you went in and executed the Search Warrant which 
was the same day on the house, you observed that that 
in fact was not a Marijuana Plant? 
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A: Correct. T. p.69 1.5-17. 
Mr. Caffrey was 45-50 feet away, which he admitted, when he 
purportedly made this observation. T. p.70 1.8-12. The Court 
can view the "translucent" panel from the same vantage point, 
notwithstanding a lot of snow, by reviewing the original 
photographs submitted to the Trial Court in support of Appellants 
Motion To Suppress, Brown, R. 82-86, specifically R. 84. 
Defendants1 Exhibit 3, a photo taken by the police, clearly 
illustrates that the "vine" which turned out not to be, or to be 
anything even remotely similar to, the five pronged Marijuana 
Leaf "silhouette" Caffrey swore he saw in the Affidavit doesn't 
really look like anything. Caffrey testified that one could make 
out the likeness to Marijuana "even better" in Exhibit 3 than on 
his pre-affidavit visit. Exhibit 3, however, literally shows 
nothing comprehensible. It certainly was incomprehensible from 
the other side of the panel at least 50 feet away whatever it 
was. Affiants statement in regard to what was seen was patently 
false. 
Unfortunately, Exhibit 3, a polaroid photograph taken by the 
police, but introduced into evidence by Appellants, has not 
survived and is not now in the record. It was missing when 
counsel checked out the record. Appellants1 counsel will 
continue to search for it and supplement the record if it can be 
found. 
Police officers, it has often been observed, are "engaged in 
the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime". 
Johnson v. U.S., 68 S.Ct. 367, 369, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). This 
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competitive aspect undoubtedly provides fertile soil to nurture 
the seeds of predisposition. That the officers were predisposed 
to see and smell what they could not in "objective 
reasonableness" have done is without question. That they did not 
see the distinctive five pronged narrow leaves of a Marijuana 
Plant is evident from the evidence. The expert testimony, 
Exhibit 3, and Mr. Caffrey's own testimony indicate that such 
observations could not have been and were not made. 
A: The Marijuana Leaf has a serrated edges along with the 
cilia, the hairs along it. But I know you could not 
see that through the plastic that was covering it. Its 
a very small serration where the hashish hangs in the 
middle of that serration. 
Q: The statements indicate, including the one pressed 
against the panel, that I ("it", sic.) had the 
silhouette of a Marijuana Leave. 
A: Right. 
Q: How strong is your opinion with respect to that? 
A: I don't believe you could identify that as a Marijuana 
Plant using my standard when I was an officer, to say 
that is a Marijuana Plant. 
Q: You certainly couldn't see the cilia or hairs under the 
leaves, could you? 
A: No. 
Q: And you wouldn't be able to see the serrated edge? 
A: Not from a distance. (Testimony Krista Pickens, T. 
p.18, 1.3-23. 
Such representations did mislead Judge Fuchs acting as the 
Magistrate and it was reckless to present it in the fashion 
presented. This was not judicial error. It was sloppy, 
shorthand police work, which should not be countenanced. 
"The good faith exception for searches 
conducted pursuant to Warrants is not 
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intended to signal our unwillingness to 
strictly enforce the requirements of the 
Fourth Amendment, and we do not believe it 
will have this effect." U.S. vs. Leon, 82 
L.Ed.2d at 699. 
The Affiant had to seriously doubt the truth of his 
averments regarding smell and certainly sight. (See T. p.20, 1.2-
4) No other conclusion, given the objective evidence, is 
reasonable. Therefore, the Search Warrant must be voided and the 
evidence excluded even if this Court were to believe in the 
facial existence of probable cause. Delaware v. Franks, 94 S.Ct. 
2674, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). 
As stated in the previously quoted decision of Johnson v. 
U.S. , 
"[3,4] The point of the Fourth Amendment, 
which often is not grasped by zealous 
officers, is not that it denies law 
enforcement the support of the usual 
inferences which reasonable men draw from 
evidence. Its protection consists in 
requiring that those inferences be drawn by a 
neutral and detached magistrate instead of 
being judged by the officer engaged in the 
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out 
crime". Supra, 68 S.Ct. 369. 
To present false information subverts the function of the 
Magistrate. 
The case of Delaware v. Franks, 438 U.S. 154, 57 L.Ed.2d 
667, 98 S.Ct. 2674(1978), states that where an Affidavit is shown 
to contain incorrect information which was knowingly and 
intentionally made, or made with reckless disregard of the truth, 
"bad faith" is shown and unless the Warrant can be supported 
independently, its fruits must be suppressed. This is, to state 
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a tautology, the antithesis of the good faith required by Leon, 
supra. 
A reckless or knowingly false statement that misleads the 
Magistrate into issuing a Warrant which should not have been 
issued subverts the neutral and detached Magistrate requirement, 
and should not be countenanced, Delaware v. Franks, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court's Order Denying Appellants1 Motion to Suppress 
should be reversed, this case remanded, and bhe Trial Court 
ordered to allow Appellants to withdraw their pleas of guilty. 
Dated this day of March, 1990. 
Herschel Bullen 
McDonald and Bullen 
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I hereby certify that on the day of March, 1990, I 
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IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SAJLT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SEARCH WARRANT 
No. SQlCffi 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
To any peace officer in the State of Utah, 
Proof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before me 
by[£T, fofcfCT Cffif^y/ / I am" satisfied that there is probable 
cause to believe, J 
That (X) on the premises known as 1268 Montgomery, one story 
brown brick residence, 1276 Montgomery, one story red 
brick residence, with a common driveway and backyard, 
the curtilage of both and a white shed behind 1268 
Montgomery, 
In the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there 
is now certain property or evidence described as: 
Marijuana plants, psychedelic mushrooms, paraphernalia used 
for growing, harvesting, and processing these plants, 
and that said property or evidence: 
(X) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, or 
(X) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense, or 
(X) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a 
means of committing or concealing a public offense, or 
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct. 
You are therefore commanded 
(X) in the day time, until ^JcrTUXT"p.m. 
to make a search of the above-named or described premises for the 
herein-above described property or evidence and if you find the same 
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or any part thereof, to bring it forthwith before me at the Fifth 
Circuit Court, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, or retain such 
property in your custody, subject to the order of this court. 
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this y dav,.a£_Novemberf 1988. 
JUDG^^TaTU^^J^TR^CIRCUI T COURT 
iHi^ooo II 
DAVID E . YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
HOWARD R. LEMCKE 
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone: (801) 363-1900 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of Salt Lake ) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
SZFCRE: D*** j /vc// 450 South 2nd East 
JUDGE ADDRESS 
The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says 
That he has reason to believe 
f U - *- (X) on t h e p r e m i s e s k n o w n ^ a s 1268 Montgomery, 4one s t o r y 
brown b r i c k r e s i d e n c e s 127 6 Montgomery, A one s t o r y red 
b r i c k r e s i d e n c e , w i t h a common dr iveway and b a c k y a r d , *~d ^ 
t h e c u r t l i a g e of b o t h and a whi te shed beh ind 1268 
Montgomery, 
In t h e C i t y of S a l t Lake, County of S a l t Lake, S t a t e of Utah, t h e r e 
i s now c e r t a i n p r o p e r t y or e v i d e n c e d e s c r i b e d as: 
M a r i j u a n a p l a n t s , p s y c h e d e l i c mushrooms, p a r a p h e r n a l i a used 
f o r g r o w i n g , h a r v e s t i n g , and p r o c e s s i n g t h e s e p l a n t s , 
and t h a r s a i d p r o p e r t y or e v i d e n c e : 
(X) was u n l a w f u l l y a c q u i r e d o r i s u n l a w f u l l y p o s s e s s e d , o r 
(X) h a s been used t o commit o r c o n c e a l a p u b l i c o f f e n s e , o r 
(X) i s b e i n g p o s s e s s e d w i t h t h e pu rpose t o use i t as a 
means of commi t t i ng o r c o n c e a l i n g a p u b l i c o f f e n s e , o r 
(X) c o n s i s t s of an i t e m o r c o n s t i t u t e s e v i d e n c e of i l l e g a l 
c o n d u c t , p o s s e s s e d by a p a r t y t o t h e i l l e g a l c o n d u c t . 
A f f i a n t b e l i e v e s t h e p r o p e r t y and e v i d e n c e d e s c r i b e d above i s 
e v i d e n c e of t h e c r ime (s) of c u l t i v a t i o n and p o s s e s s i o n of c o n t r o l l e d 
s u b s t a n c e s . 
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The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant 
are: 
A phone call was made to Crime Solvers, by their informant 
6637 who identified himself to Crime Solvers. 663*7 stated 
a David and Susan Elkins lived in 1268 Montgomery and owned 
the adjacent property 1276 Montgomery that was vacant. 
That they used both homes and their attached greenhouses to 
grow Marijuana and psychedelic mushrooms. 6637 stated that 
he has confronted children who have possessed baggies of 
marijuana brought from these buildings. 
Your affiant and other officers walked down a canal that 
runs behind these two properties. The two houses were seen 
to possess many small details 6637 described to Crime 
Solvers. Large plants were evident through the translucent 
panels in the greenhouse including one pressed against the 
panel that had the silhouette of a marijuana leaf. The 
unique smell of large quantities of green marijuana was 
pervasive as your affiant and officer Caffery walked past 
the backyards and the greenhouse. 
Your affiant considers the information received from the 
confidential informant reliable because he fully identified himself 
to Crime Solver. He has a particularized interest in the welfare of 
one of the children. 
Your affiant has verified the above information from the 
confidential informant to be correct and accurate through the 
following independent investigation: 
Ey confirming through public utilities that David Elkins 
owns both homes. Ey walking by and confirming much detail 
O f 6 6 3 7 ' S a c c o u n t M.*f\te T V ^ QRftNJHOuseS ^ ^ ^*C*f;-C>To Tr^ (CM? of. G-SVi Pr^eS, 
WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the 
seizure of said items: 
(X) in the day time, untii'~~xtr^ ?~' p.m 
^ • - - GAW r o 
JvFFIAllT/ ,/';,. m ^ 
SU3SCRI5ED AND SWORN TO EEFORE ME t h i s y ASafy'sof ^ b ^ i e r , 1988 X <S / ^a 'ys ' b ' b y r f e r 19! 
j u D G T i r T ^ p X r ^ j
 t<ClRCUIT COURT, 
IK AND -•* ,ORV^£&r'ii^KE COUNTY, STATE 
